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The Potential Unintended
Consequences of the O’Bannon Decision
Matthew J. Parlow*
Abstract
The O’Bannon decision made a significant change to one of
the philosophical pillars of intercollegiate athletics in allowing for
greater compensation for student athletes. At the same time, the
court took only an incremental step in the direction of pay for
college athletes: The decision was limited to football and men’s
basketball players—as opposed to non-revenue-generating sports—
and it set a yearly cap of $5,000 for each of these athletes.
However, the court left open the possibility for—indeed, it almost
seemed to invite—future challenges to the National Collegiate
Athletic
Association’s
restrictions
on
student-athlete
compensation. In this regard, the court’s incremental step in
college athlete pay may be a harbinger of more dramatic and
structural changes to come in the college athletic system. While
this Essay does not take a normative position on the legal or
economic justifications for such a possible change in
intercollegiate athletics, it does seek to describe some of the
potential unintended consequences of a free(r) marketplace for
student-athlete services. In particular, this Essay analyzes the
possible implications and impact on Title IX, as well as college
athletic opportunities and values more generally. In doing so, this
Essay attempts to explain why the court’s more cautious approach
may be needed going forward to balance the varied interest in the
college athletic system.

* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Marquette
University Law School.
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I. Introduction
The O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association1
case sent shockwaves through the sports law world. The case was
particularly notable because it advanced the ability of certain
college athletes to receive greater compensation than under the
restrictive rules of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA). At the same time, the $5,000 cap that the district court
set for athlete pay made the decision somewhat more limited in
its immediate impact.2 However, the district court’s decision left
open future challenges to the NCAA’s anticompetitive restrictions
on college athlete compensation that may well overcome the
procompetitive justifications. In fact, the district court almost
seemed to invite future plaintiffs to bring lawsuits that sought
even greater levels of compensation. Such challenges could
raise—or even eliminate entirely—this $5,000 cap and thus
dramatically alter the system of college athletics. Indeed,
subsequent challenges to the NCAA could well bring about the

1. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
2. See Permanent Injunction, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
No. C-09-3329-CW, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (limiting NCAA college athlete
pay to $5,000).
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“[f]ar [g]rander [c]hange” that Professor Marc Edelman hopes will
flow from the O’Bannon decision.3
This Essay does not seek to normatively assess the merits of
further compensating student athletes for competing in collegiate
athletics.4 Nor does it strive to analyze the legal bases for the
district court’s decision in O’Bannon. Instead, this Essay
endeavors to provide insight into why the district court may have
taken a more tempered approach in its decision—perhaps to
avoid destabilizing the entire intercollegiate athletic system. In
addition, this Essay hopes to foreshadow some of the potential
unintended consequences for college athletics: specifically with
regard to Title IX advances and the robust number of sports
currently played competitively at many of the NCAA’s member
schools.5 These potential pitfalls are particularly relevant in light
of the looming National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) decision
regarding the ability for college athletes to unionize.6 In
3. See generally Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College
Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
2319 (2014). The currently pending Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association case—also referred to by many in the sports law industry as the
Kessler case—could bring even greater change than the O’Bannon decision.
No. 14-cv-2758 (N.D. Cal. 2014). While some have described the O’Bannon case
as a set-back—if not a bar—to the Jenkins plaintiffs, the district court’s decision
in O’Bannon strongly suggests that further challenges to the NCAA’s
anticompetitive restraints could well overcome the procompetitive justifications.
4. There is certainly merit to the position of compensating student
athletes to better reflect the value they bring. Many student athletes come from
modest backgrounds. We allow teenagers to work and get paid. And we have
seen many young adults in their late-teens and early-twenties become incredibly
wealthy as musicians, actors/actresses, and even as entrepreneurs. Thus, it is
not such a stretch to consider changing a college athletic system that may have
been originally built on a foundation of amateurism but that has certainly
morphed into an extremely profitable enterprise for many colleges and
universities. Nevertheless, it is outside of the scope of this Essay to fully address
the arguments on both sides of this debate.
5. This Essay presumes for purposes of the following analysis that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals does not reverse the district court’s decision.
6. See Lewis Lazare, NLRB Gets the Case of the Northwestern Football
Player Union and the Wait Begins, CHICAGO BUS. J. (Aug. 1, 2014, 2:50 PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/chicago/news/2014/08/01/nlrb-gets-the-case-of-thenorthwestern-football.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing the matter
pending before the NLRB regarding whether the Northwestern University
football players can unionize) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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highlighting some of the potential unintended consequences of
even greater change in college athlete compensation, this Essay
provides a cautionary context for the judiciary, the NCAA, and
colleges and universities as they navigate the post-O’Bannon
landscape.
II. The O’Bannon Decision and Its Potential Impacts
A. The District Court’s Incremental Approach
In its O’Bannon decision, the district court allowed colleges
and universities—beginning in 2016—to pay their college
athletes in football and men’s basketball up to $5,000 cap per
year (to be held in trust for the athletes until their eligibility
expires).7 The court, however, did not provide much explanation
or transparency regarding why the amount was capped at $5,000.
There are some potential explanations as to why the district
court—in setting this cap—took an incremental approach in
advancing this change in college athletics. Indeed, there may be
much merit to this prudent approach of beginning a gradual
process that may well lead to student athletes receiving
compensation more commensurate with their value to their
respective colleges and universities.
The district court could have taken a more ambitious
approach, but instead it punted. The court could have potentially
found that there were even fewer and/or less restrictive means for
the NCAA to achieve its goals than the $5,000 amount. The court
could have taken the position that student athletes should be able
to earn remuneration greater than that cap—amounts more
commensurate with the value of their athletic services and
personae. The court could have accomplished this, for example, by
going as far as creating a purely free market for collegiate
athletes. Instead, the court seemed to recognize that to do so
Review).
7. See Permanent Injunction, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc.,
No. C-09-3329-CW, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (limiting NCAA college athlete
pay to $5,000). The district court’s decision does not apply to non-revenue
athletes. See id.
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would have been to unsettle a long-established college athletic
system that had been designed and constructed on certain
fundamental assumptions—such as limited student-athlete
compensation. In this regard, the district court echoes themes
from the Flood v. Kuhn8 case, where the United States Supreme
Court seemed unwilling—despite a clearly inaccurate precedent
of granting an antitrust exemption to Major League Baseball
because it had been previously found not to be engaged in
interstate commerce—to change baseball’s reserve clause (and
thus bring about a more robust form of free agency).9 As its
decision demonstrated, the Supreme Court was simply unwilling
to unsettle a well-established (and deliberately designed) playerretention structure for baseball. The Court did not foreclose a
legislative solution, but it refused to change judicially the status
quo.10
Similarly, the O’Bannon court may have realized that a
sudden change to student-athlete compensation could well have
posed significant economic and budgetary challenges for colleges
and universities that are already facing difficult financial
circumstances. In this regard, the district court may have
correctly deduced that while more robust student-athlete
compensation was likely inevitable, an incremental approach
would help ensure a more stable transition. Such an approach
would allow colleges and universities to adapt and adjust to the
changes on the horizon. At $5,000 per student-athlete in football
and men’s basketball, the system that is scheduled to become
effective in 2016 would likely not be cost prohibitive for most, if
not all, colleges and universities. Moreover, a slower transition to
a free(r) marketplace for college athletes would also have a
greater likelihood of success and acceptance than if a sudden
change had occurred—one that could have led to significant
disruptions and problems in college athletics.
8. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
9. See generally id. (finding that professional baseball’s reserve system
was exempt from federal antitrust laws and therefore did not violate a player’s
right to contract).
10. See id. at 285 (affirming the New York Court of Appeals’s decision and
holding that “the remedy, if any is indicated, is for congressional, and not
judicial, action”).
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B. The Impact of Collegiate Athletic Opportunities
It is this eventual free(r) marketplace for college athletes and
their services and personae that Professor Edelman excitedly
anticipates.11 To be sure, there is much merit to Professor
Edelman’s goal—both legally and economically. But this grander
change—whether achieved in the immediate or in the more
distant future—may have unintended consequences that unsettle
college athletics in unanticipated ways. For example, a dramatic
increase in college athlete compensation could create a tale of two
universities—that is, a small group of well-funded colleges and
universities that would able to pay the elite high school athletes
to matriculate on the one hand and the vast majority of other
schools that would be unable to compete for elite talent on the
other hand. Some might even argue that this trend towards a
wider gap in college athletic parity was already occurring through
the formation and/or bolstering of the five NCAA megaconferences.12
It is, ironically, this competitive imbalance that professional
sports leagues seek to protect against with their various policies.
Professional sports leagues attempt to avoid the consolidation of
the most talented or “star” players into the largest media markets
(such as New York, Los Angeles, and the like).13 Given a
completely free marketplace, the elite athletes in professional
sports leagues might well choose teams in these larger media
markets because those teams would have greater resources to pay
11. See Edelman, supra note 3, at 2355–56.
12. See Matt Hinton, Division Zero: What the NCAA’s “Power Five”
Autonomy Decision Means for the Future of College Sports, GRANTLAND.COM
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://grantland.com/the-triangle/division-zero-what-the-ncaaspower-five-autonomy-decision-means-for-the-future-of-college-sports/
(last
visited Dec. 30, 2014) (discussing the NCAA’s decision regarding megaconference autonomy and its effect on college sports generally) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See, e.g., Andrew Larsen et al., The Impact of Free Agency and the
Salary Cap on Competitive Balance in the National Football League, 7 J. SPORTS
ECON. 376 (2006) (“[F]ree agency and salary cap restrictions tend to promote
competitive balance, whereas a concentration of player talent reduces
competitiveness among teams.”).
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higher salaries.14 In addition, the size of such media markets
would help these players garner more lucrative endorsement
deals and gain greater international exposure. In the absence of
greater restraints on player movement or structural incentives
and disincentives affecting the marketplace for elite athletes,
professional sports leagues would likely face a situation of a lack
of parity among teams based on their market size and revenue
streams. Professional sports leagues worry about this potential
phenomenon for they fear that it would hurt the long-term
viability of smaller-market franchises and thus the overall
stability of their respective leagues.15 In fact, competitive balance
is sufficiently important to the strength and longevity of
professional sports leagues that courts have even recognized this
value as a procompetitive justification for leagues to pursue when
imposing player restraints.16
Given the importance of competitive balance, professional
sports leagues have implemented a variety of restraints on
players through collective bargaining agreements (CBA) to avoid
competitive imbalance through such a consolidation of player
talent in a handful of larger media markets. Such restraints
include delays or limitations to free agency such as an amateur
player draft and corresponding rookie contracts that enable a
team to keep the players that they drafted for a certain number of
years before the players reach free agency.17 Professional sports
14. See, e.g., Moke Hamilton, How NBA’s Luxury Tax Penalties Will Impact
Elite
Teams,
BLEACHERREPORT.COM
(Dec.
26,
2012),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1457745-how-nbas-luxury-tax-penalties-willimpact-elite-teams (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing the NBA’s concern,
during the renegotiation of the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement in 2011
that the ability for large-market teams to significantly outspend the smallermarket teams threatened competitive balance and the long-term health of the
league) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See id. (noting concern that a large-market team may significantly
outspend a smaller-market team).
16. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010)
(“We have recognized . . . that the interest in maintaining a competitive balance
among athletic teams is legitimate and important.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
17. See Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons from the
NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 482–83 (2013)
(describing historical methods to impose labor restraints on players).
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league CBAs also impose more indirect forms of restraints on
player movement such as salary caps and maximum salary
amounts and contract lengths.18 For example, if teams are limited
in how much they can spend on player salaries—both
individually and in the aggregate—it makes it almost impossible
for a handful of teams to attract and pay all of the elite players in
the league. The CBAs in professional sports leagues also provide
for more favorable contractual terms for players to sign with their
current teams before or when they become free agents to create
incentives for players to re-sign with their teams (often the teams
that drafted them).19 In addition, these leagues—through their
CBAs as well as other means—attempt to provide for robust
revenue sharing and shared revenue to minimize disparities in
revenue between large-market and small-market teams.20 In
doing so, these leagues attempt to create a more level playing
field among teams for paying for a competitive roster of players.
In all of these different manners, professional sports leagues seek
to maintain and nurture competitive balance.
The historical development of these various tools for seeking
competitive balance in professional sports is a long, complex, and
litigious tale—one that is outside the scope of this Essay.
However, even the overview of the many avenues for achieving
competitive balance in professional sports should provide a
warning to those involved in college athletics. The creation of two
unequal tiers of college athletic programs could end relative
parity in college athletics and potentially lead to a dramatically
18. See Russell T. Gorkin, Sports-League Player Restraints, Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, and Federal Labor Law in the Context of the National Football
League, 5 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 11–13 (2014) (describing salary caps in
the context of the NFL); Matthew J. Parlow, Lessons from the NBA Lockout:
Union Democracy, Public Support, and the Folly of the National Basketball
Players Association, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2014) (detailing maximum contract
lengths and salary amounts in the NBA).
19. See Parlow, supra note 18, at 7–8 (explaining how the Larry Bird
exception to the NBA’s salary cap provides players longer contract lengths and
more lucrative salaries for re-signing with their current team).
20. See generally Justin R. Hunt, Note, To Share or Not to Share: Revenue
Sharing Structures in Professional Sports, 13 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 139
(2012) (noting the importance of balance between large- and small-market
teams).
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different system that provides far fewer opportunities for
amateur athletes to compete at the collegiate level. It is not hard
to imagine those colleges and universities in the non-elite tier of
schools struggling for sponsorships, lucrative television contracts,
alumni and booster support, and the like. One only need look to
the disparity in attendance and revenue between professional
teams in Major League Baseball and their minor league
affiliates—or teams in the National Basketball Association and
their National Basketball Development league affiliates—to get a
sense for the decline of interest and revenue that a more
polarized collegiate athletic system could spur. In short, these
non-elite schools might struggle to maintain pre-O’Bannon
revenue streams and amounts because they are no longer as
competitive under a free(r) market for college athletes.
Whether their revenues shrank or their costs rose under the
new system, many colleges and universities might consider
cutting athletic programs, particularly those that did not produce
much, if any, revenue. Very few, if any, college athletic programs
are self-funded or revenue-neutral (or better) in their entirety.21
Given the economic challenges facing higher education today, one
could foresee colleges and universities cutting costs in nonrevenue-generating athletic programs as their teams became less
competitive, their costs for athletic programs increased, and/or
their revenue derived from athletics declined. Absent offsetting
cuts from elsewhere within the school’s overall budget, the only
other option for these colleges and universities to maintain their
athletic programs at their pre-O’Bannon levels would be to
increase tuition for its other students. This result seems unlikely
given the growing awareness of the challenges of student debt.
Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that many colleges
and universities may cut some sports that run budgetary deficits.
Such a reduction in athletic programs and opportunities would
undercut one of the NCAA’s core values: “[t]he supporting role
21. See Steve Berkowitz, Jodi Upton & Erik Brady, Most NCAA Division I
Athletic Departments Take Subsidies, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013, 12:48 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/07/ncaa-financessubsidies/2142443/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (noting that most of the subsidies
come from student fees and state funding) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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that intercollegiate athletics plays in the higher education
mission and in enhancing the sense of community and
strengthening the identity of member institutions.”22
C. Title IX Implications
Just as importantly, there will almost certainly be Title IX
implications and effects based on the O’Bannon decision and
potential changes in the collegiate athletic system. For example,
while Title IX does not require precise equal treatment between
male and female athletes—rather, it requires proportionality23—
there is no doubt that compensating male college football and
basketball players will draw scrutiny from a gender equity
perspective.24 Some have already speculated that if colleges and
universities that pay their male football and basketball players
up to the $5,000 stipend and fail to compensate some of their
female athletes, these schools may well face Title IX lawsuits
from their female athletes.25 One way to ensure Title IX
compliance would be for schools that paid their ninety-eight
football and men’s basketball players the stipend—eighty-five
scholarship athletes on the football team and thirteen on the
men’s basketball team—to also pay a matching number of
athletes from women’s sports.26 Some schools are even
22. NCAA Core Values, NCAA.COM, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-corepurpose-and-values (last visited Dec. 2, 2014) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
23. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–87 (2012) (describing treatment to which both
sexes are entitled); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2013) (stating that discrimination in
athletics is not allowed).
24. See Michael McCann, What Ed O’Bannon’s Antitrust Victory Over the
NCAA Means Going Forward, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 9, 2014),
http://www.si.com/college-basketball/2014/08/09/ed-obannon-ncaa-claudiawilken-appeal-name-image-likeness-rights (last visited Dec. 30, 2014)
(explaining that the O’Bannon decision might lead colleges to violate Title IX)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
25. See Jon Soloman, Q&A: What the O’Bannon Ruling Means for NCAA,
Schools and Athletes, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 9, 2014, 6:30 PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24654805/qa-whatthe-obannon-ruling-means-for-the-ncaa-schools-and-athletes (last visited Dec.
30, 2014) (noting that Title IX issues will arise in the wake of the O’Bannon
decision) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Ben Strauss, After Ruling in O’Bannon Case, Determining the
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considering paying the $5,000 stipend to all of their scholarship
athletes.27 As these proposals demonstrate, colleges and
universities will be carefully considering Title IX implications of
their reactions to O’Bannon decision.
However, there is an even greater threat to Title IX than a
potential shift in the collegiate athletic system that the response
to O’Bannon may bring. As mentioned above, if the costs of
football and men’s basketball—or perhaps even all college
sports—increase dramatically, many colleges and universities
may well reduce a number of non-revenue-producing sports.
Schools will be mindful of Title IX in this process. In this regard,
colleges and universities will not make such reduction only at the
expense of women’s sports. Rather, to remain in compliance with
Title IX, they are more likely to reduce men’s and women’s sports
in a roughly proportional manner. Nevertheless, the overall
reduction in athletic opportunities—particularly those in
women’s sports—would be a regression in the advances made by
Title IX. Indeed, one of the great legacies of Title IX is the
proliferation of women’s sports at the collegiate level and the
various opportunities that this presents for these athletes—both
in college and beyond.28
Finally, these potential pitfalls may be acutely compounded
by the looming NLRB’s decision regarding the ability for college
athletes to unionize.29 The unionization of college athletes could
further drive up costs for colleges and universities and create
even more difficult budgetary decisions for schools with
competitive athletic programs. Depending on the costs that the
Future
of
Amateur
Athletics,
NY
TIMES
(Oct.
21,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/sports/after-obannon-ruling-figuring-outwhats-next.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2014) (describing four potential options
that universities may follow) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See id. (noting stipends as one of the options).
28. See Jane McManus, NCAA Reforms: Good for Female Athletes?, ESPN
(Aug.
13,
2014),
http://espn.go.com/espnw/newscommentary/article/11347170/espnw-why-ncaa-reforms-really-good-really-badwomen-sports (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining that women’s sports have
always been valued as an educational tool) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
29. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the pending NLRB
case).
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O’Bannon decision and unionization bring to collegiate athletics,
it is not too far a stretch to foresee many colleges and universities
scaling their athletic programs back to a very limited number of
men’s and women’s sports if the costs—without corresponding
new revenues and/or cost savings—increase significantly.
III. Conclusion
A free(r) marketplace for college athlete compensation is not
necessarily bad or unwarranted. And Professor Edelman’s views
may be correct both legally and economically. Indeed, one only
need look at the proliferation of websites and news articles that
document the business of college athletics to understand how a
change to student-athlete compensation may well be justifiable
and appropriate.30 Moreover, none of the scenarios above are
certain to occur. The college athletic marketplace may shake out
in a very different manner that does not unsettle the values of
amateurism that some worry may decline under a pure, or at
least more robust, market for student-athlete services.
But as the various interests push to get to the far grander
things that Professor Edelman wistfully ponders, there is likely a
need for a cautious and judicious approach that tries to avoid the
kind of potential unintended consequences detailed above.
Without such a deliberate approach that balances the varied
interests inherent in the college athletic system, we could
experience a regression in important areas of college athletics
that may well be valued more than the public polls regarding
paying college athletes demonstrate.

30. See, e.g., The Business of College Sports, BUS. OF C. SPORTS,
www.businessofcollegesports.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing
information on college athlete marketing) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).

